The Transition Is Not Over, but Note the Merits of the Central European Model

Jan Svejnar
William Davidson Institute and University ofMichigan I define economic transition as a process that is completed when two conditions hold: a) central planning is abolished and no longer serves as the allocational and distributional mechanism in the economy, and b) central planning and direct government intervention is replaced by an efficiently functioning market system. The term "efficiently functioning market system" is, of course, key and needs further definition. I take it to mean that the transition economies generate relatively rapid and sustainable rates of economic growth and become compatible with advanced market economies in the sense that neither side requires major protection through subsidies or barriers against trade, capital flows, and labor mobility.
The first condition has been met in a number of economies, including those that are doing relatively well (e.g., Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia), as well as those whose economic performance has been poor (e.g., Russia and Ukraine). It must also be noted that countries such as Slovenia and Croatia have been displaying many of the transition features, but their starting point was a labor-managed system with social ownership and substantial government intervention. The first condition may hence be regarded as being a necessary one for the transition to proceed but not a sufficient one for the transition to be completed.
The second condition defines the end of the transition process as being the state of an advanced market economy. No transition economy has so far satisfied this condition, and the study of how emerging market economies become mature market economies is in fact the study of the fulfillment of this second condition.
Given my definition, it is not surprising that I have questioned declarations such as that of the Czech prime minister in 1995, when he stated that the transition was accomplished, with the remaining tasks being secondary and akin to fine-tuning in the Western economies.
Indeed, 1995 was a year for euphoria. As may be seen from Table 1 (on p. 93), the Czech Republic and the other Central European economies 1 emerged from one of the most severe depressions experienced any where in Europe in the twentieth century. With the exception of Hungary, economic growth was rapid across the region, and in most countries the rate of growth was accelerating. Inflation, which at the start of the 1990s reached the hyper zone in a number of Central European economies, was curtailed (Table 2 ). In some countries (e.g., the Czech and Slovak republics and Slovenia), the rate of inflation dipped into single digits, and in all countries in Central Europe it was below 40 percent. Unemployment, which appeared in most Central European countries in 1990 and reached a double-digit rate in all except the Czech Republic by 1992, started to show a declining tendency in 1995 (Table 3) . Slovenia as well as the Czech and Slovak republics were running balanced budgets, while the other economies were making serious strides toward reducing their budget deficits (Table 4) . Foreign direct investment, while modest compared to earlier expectations, was showing signs of acceleration (Table 5) . The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia obtained sovereign debt ratings by Standard & Poor's, and the other countries were on their way to being rated (Table 6) .
The "Central European model" of transition from Soviet-style central planning seemed to be working and doing much better than the "Russian and Newly Independent States (NIS) model" in the former Soviet Union. Taking Russia and Ukraine as examples of the latter model, we see that these countries experienced a much longer period of deep economic decline (Table 1) and only recently started to recover.
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Russia and Ukraine also suffered from a longer spell of high inflation (Table 2 ) and recorded lower unemployment rates (especially Ukraine), as restructuring of firms proceeded at a slower pace, and lowering (late payment) of wages and relying on shorter hours were preferred to layoffs as a form of labor force adjustment (Table 3) . As may be seen from Table 4 , the prolonged inflationary period had an underpinning in significant budget deficits in the first half of the 1990s. Both Russia and Ukraine attracted only modest amounts of foreign direct investment (Table 5) , and it was not until 1996 that Russia (but not Ukraine) obtained a rating (BB-) from Standard & Poor's (Table 6) .
China and Vietnam represent the third model of transition. This "Asian model" has appeared very attractive from a number of standpoints. It has been characterized by very rapid.economic growth, which in the 1990s exceeded 10 percent in China and hovered around 9 percent in Vietnam (Table 1) . Moreover, China's period of rapid economic growth has lasted two full decades. Inflation has fluctuated widely in both countries, but for most of the 1990s the rate of inflation was well below 20 percent (Table 2) . Unemployment is hard to measure in these highly agrarian economies, but until recently urban unemployment (based on official registry data) was relatively limited (Table 3) .3 China has also kept its budget deficit under control, and Vietnam has gradually brought its sizable deficit down (Table 4) . Finally, China has been relatively successful in attracting foreign direct investment (Table 5) , and it secured sovereign debt rating as early as 1993 (Table 6) .
Using a number of performance indicators, such as the ones in Tables 1-5, the Asian model appears to have produced the best results, followed by the Central European model. The Russian-NIS model has usually been seen as the least successful. The picture changed a bit in 1996-1997, as the economic performance of some Central European countries deteriorated. Thus, the Czech Republic saw a slowdown in economic growth, and in the Balkans, Bulgaria and Romania experienced a deceleration that turned into decline (Table 1y . In the Czech Republic, the early diagnosis suggests that the country did not succeed in adequately restructuring its firms and in establishing a well-functioning legal and regulatory system. Bulgaria and Romania have suffered from the same problem, coupled with a loss of macroeconomic control (Tables 2 and 4) . At the same time, in 1997, there were signs that Russia experienced its first period of economic growth and that the rate of economic decline was decelerating in Ukraine. Overall, while the rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP) slowed in Central and Eastern Europe (including the Balkans and the Baltic states) from over 5 percent in 1995 to about 3 percent in 1997, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) turned a 1 percent decline into a 1 percent rate of growth during the same period. The 1998 crisis showed that the Russian and CIS model was fragile.
I will review the principal aspects of the transformation in Central Europe and contrast these features with those of the transition economies in the other models. Then I will discuss the challenges faced by Central Europe if it is to complete its economic transition.
THE PRINCIPAL ASPECTS OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN TRANSITION
Some outcomes have been relatively systematic, while others have varied across the Central European countries. The systematic developments-those that are similar across countries-are the transformation of these economies from centrally planned or government-guided, labor-managed economies to essentially market economies; relatively successful macroeconomic stabilization (exemplified by the countriesI ability to contain initial inflationary pressures); opening up to world trade and reorienting trade from East to West; the rapid creation of a large number of small-and medium-sized enterprises; significant reduction in state subsidies to firms together with the creation of a substantial social safety net; and the development of laws, institutions, and practices conducive to the functioning of labor, capital, and goods markets.
Outcomes that have varied across these countries include the extent of privatization and restructuring of state enterprises; the rates of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells; the ability to contain budget deficits and foreign indebtedness; and the perceived effectiveness of reforms as measured by the rate of domestic investment, inflow of foreign direct investment, foreign trade performance, and rate of economic growth.
The Systematic Developments
The most notable outcome of the first eight years of the transition in Central Europe is that these economies have undergone a virtually complete transformation from disintegrating central planning (or cen-tralized labor-management) into an imperfect but vibrant market system. Broadly speaking, these economies now operate on market principles. Most prices are free and reflect relative scarcities of resources. The economies are open to international trade and are composed of a dynamic and rapidly growing sector of new private firms, together with a heterogeneous but generally shrinking sector of the old (in most countries, former) state enterprises. In this respect, the Central European economies resemble China, where the township and village enterprises (TVEs), operating under relatively hard budget constraints and market principles, have also provided a major impetus for economic development. The picture has been quite different in Russia and in many of the newly independent states, where market forces are still weak and the impact of new firms is limited.
Eager to dismantle the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trading system that existed within the Soviet bloc and faced with a collapsing Soviet market, the Central European economies have dramatically reoriented their trade (see, for example, Brabant 1993) . While all of them traded for decades primarily within the CMEA, by 1993-1994 the European Community replaced the ex-CMEA region as their principal trading partner. This achievement is notable for two reasons: 1) few observers had expected these countries to be able to penetrate substantially the advanced Western markets, and virtually no one had expected them to do so in such a short time interval, and 2) the reorientation was carried out to a large extent by state enterprises before any privatization took place. Major currency devaluations, reductions of subsidies to firms, and the opening of trade have been the factors driving the transformation in this area. In their ability to export manufactured goods, the Central European countries again more resemble China than the CIS countries, which, except for export of raw materials, have remained relatively self-contained. In contrast to China, the Central European countries have also opened up much more to imports and capital flows.
While undertaking bold transformation measures, the Central European countries have been quick to provide a relatively complete and generous social safety net. Unemployment benefits were originally set at high levels and remain adequate even after rounds of reductions in the midst of reforms. A broadly defined system, providing welfare, pension, and health care benefits, was also put in place. The system has so far enabled policymakers in Central Europe to prevent the emergence of major income inequality and poverty, unlike the situation in Russia (see Garner and Terrell 1998) . In China, most of the economy has not been covered by a central social safety net. The net exists in the case of state-owned firms, but the government is currently moving to reduce its fiscal obligations toward workers in these enterprises.
Diverse Outcomes
Privatization of state enterprises has proceeded very unevenly across the Central European economies. In the Czech and Slovak republics, for example, most state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been mass-privatized, but restructuring and productivity growth have been slow. In contrast, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia initially placed less emphasis on privatizing the state-owned firms, but unit labor cost, expressed in German marks, has been rising more slowly in these economies than in the Czech and Slovak republics. In fact, in the first half of the 1990s, the emphasis in Poland and Slovenia shifted from privatization to commercialization of state or socially owned enterprises. Only in the last two years has there been a significant move in these economies to privatize state or socially owned firms. Hungary has pursued a persistent policy of individual sales of firms and has succeeded in selling a significant share of the economy over the last eight years. In this aspect of the transition process, Russia resembles more the Czech and Slovak republics in that it mass-privatized. The process and the recipients of property have differed, but in both cases the resulting corporate governance has been taking time to be organized. China and Vietnam more resemble Poland and Slovenia, in that until recently they focused less on privatization of SOEs and more on other aspects of the transition.
Firms in all of the Central European countries decreased employment as they experienced falling demand for their output in the early 1990s. The amount of labor force adjustment differed, however, across the individual countries. Firms in Hungary, for example, adjusted employment more than those in the Czech Republic. Using large enterprise-level data sets with annual observations from the pretransition and transition period, Basu, Estrin, and in fact show that. the extent of pretransition "marketization" of the economy is correlated with the extent of employment adjustment in the early phase of the transition. In particular, in 1989 and 1990, Czech and Slovak firms behaved in accordance with a stereotype of a laborhoarding firm in a planned economy-not being forced to adjust employment in response to changes in output and wages. The Polish firms conformed to the stereotype of operating·in a semimarket economy by showing moderate sensitivity of employment to output and wages. Estimates for later years indicate that all three economies converged to higher elasticities, thus displaying behavior similar to that observed in Western market economies. In contrast, data from Russian industrial firms fail to show any significant elasticity of labor demand to wages as late as [1993] [1994] .
The levels of investment declined in Central Europe during the first phase of the transition in the early 1990s, but by the mid 1990s they began to improve. In fact, it appears that by the mid 19908, gross investment returned to relatively high levels (around 30 percent of GDP) in the Czech and Slovak republics and to respectable levels (over 20' percent of GDP) in Poland and Hungary. The Czech and Slovak levels are comparable to those in China and Vietnam, while the levels in Poland and Hungary resemble those observed in Western Europe. In contrast, according to data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), investment continued to decline at a rapid pace in Russia through the mid 1990s.
At about 70 percent and 40 percent, respectively, Hungary and Poland registered the highest foreign debt/GNP ratios in the region in the early to mid 1990s. In contrast, Slovenia's ratio was about 5 percent, and the Czech Republic's was below 25 percent. The different burdens of indebtedness influenced the approach that the individual countries adopted toward carrying out the transformation to a market economy. Hungary, having been saddled with the highest foreign debt, has, for instance, decided to privatize by selling firms individually to foreign and domestic bidders, while the Czech Republic gave out substantial stakes in firms to citizens at large through the voucher privatization method.
Although the Central European countries all succeeded in reorienting trade from Eastern to Western partners, their exchange rate policies and the resulting foreign trade performances have been diverse. For example, while Poland and Hungary repeatedly devalued their currencies and eventually adopted a crawling peg system as their exchange rate policy, the Czechs and Slovaks followed the approach of a fixed exchange rate until 1997 and 1998, respectively. This policy resulted in an overvaluation of the Czech and Slovak currencies relative to those of Poland and Hungary. Consequently, while Poland and to a lesser extent Hungary registered solid growth of exports in the mid 1990s, the Czech and Slovak republics have been experiencing slower export growth and increasingly severe balance-of-trade and payments deficits. The Czechs were forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate in 1997, and the Slovaks in 1998. The policy of overvalued exchange rates, in my view, explains a significant part (though not all) of the poorer economic performance of the Czech Republic relative to that of other Central European countries in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
The developments to date point to a number of challenges that the Central European economies must meet if they are to improve their efficiency, raise their living standards, and thus complete their transition to well-functioning and relatively advanced market economies. The foremost challenge is how to generate high and sustained rates of economic growth. This challenge has several underpinnings. The principal aspect is the political one, namely, that economic growth with widely reaching benefits is a prerequisite for maintaining momentum in the transition. Since the early post-revolutionary euphoria has by now evaporated, it is increasingly difficult for politicians to secure consensus for major restructuring (be it at the level of firms, banks, or the pension and health system). Of course, there is a chicken-and-egg problem here: cooperation of the people is needed for restructuring and growth, but the benefits of growth are needed for inducing cooperation. In view of the slowdown in economic growth in the region over the last three years, the question is whether the Central European countries will be able to maintain the momentum to complete the transition.
Put in more quantitative terms, the fundamental question is whether the Central European economies can generate long-term growth of GDP of 7 percent or more. With GDP per capita in Central Europe at 25-40 percent of the Western European average, high growth rates will have to be achieved and sustained if these countries are to start closing the relative productivity and income gap with Western Europe and the OECD countries in general. This challenge is truly formidable. The following tasks, in my view, constitute the building blocks for meeting this challenge.
A high rate of efficiently placed investment is a prerequisite" for economic growth in the region. In view of past developments, this requirement is still a major hurdle for the Central European economies. As the transformation to a market economy unfolded, it was expected that market forces would induce a dramatic improvement in the efficiency of investment and that the key problem would be the availability of capital embodying modern technology. It turns out that, while the availability of capital clearly became a major concern for many firms, poor credit allocation by many banks has meant that the efficiency of capital allocation did not increase as much as was anticipated.
The transition was hence expected to result in a partial reversal of the previous situation, in which the rates of investment were high but the efficiency of capital allocation was poor. 4 The decade of the 1980s was marked by a fall in the rate of investment in many Central and Eastern European economies, together with the acceleration of technical progress in the West and the Western embargo on exports of high technology to the Soviet bloc. These factors brought about the worsening of the relative technological position of the Central and Eastern European economies. With the notable exception of Slovenia, these countries entered the transition facing an acute need to spur investment . embodying modern technology. So far they have succeeded only in part, primarily in instances where there have been major Western investments. A key problem in this context has been the limited inflow of foreign direct investment in all Central European countries except Hungary.. While the situation appears to be changing, the inflow over the first eight years of the transition has been small in comparison to the annual inflows of foreign direct investment in the (until recently) rapidly growing East Asian economies. One problem is that, in an attempt to reduce budgetary defici~s and to establish adequate social safety nets, most transitional economies have imposed high corporate taxes, which put a brake on foreign, as well as domestic, investment. Another problem is that Western investors have been wary of many Central and Eastern European economies. Perceived uncertainty has been high, deriving in part from unclear property rights and nontransparent regulation of the financial sector in some economies. The clear lesson is that attracting foreign direct investment is a long and arduous process.
On the domestic front, the capital market has been developing only slowly as an effective source of investment funds. The banking sector is still highly concentrated, often significantly state-owned and inefficient' and facing limited foreign competition. Interest rates on loans have been high as banks have been allowed to keep a sizable spread between deposit and lending rates in order to create reserves. Moreover, central banks have often pursued high-interest-rate policies in order to prevent capital flight. The problem has been especially acute for export-oriented firms in countries maintaining overvalued exchange rates. These firms have faced moderate Western inflation in the product market and relatively high domestic interest rate costs.
High interest rates have also slowed the development of small-and medium-sized firms. Moreover, after an initial period of easy lending to small private-sector firms, banks have in recent years restricted lending to and set high collateral requirements for small businesses. Given the key role that this sector has played in the transformation so far, it is clear that future overall business performance will be jeopardized if this part of the economy becomes significantly handicapped.
The situation of loan shortages is partly brought about by asymmetric information between the banks and entrepreneurs. The banks often report that they have funds but cannot find good projects, while entrepreneurs claim that they are not able to get financing for projects with high expected returns. The problem is related to the fact that commercial banks in Central Europe have not had an adequate number of well-trained and experienced loan officers and that they have generally suffered from inefficient operations. These shortcomings result in a limited ability of the banks to appraise and monitor projects. Still, lending funds to enterprises whose liquidation value may be very low requires that the banks be able to track and control the operation. If this condition cannot be fulfilled because the banks cannot obtain reliable information, the banks will prefer not to lend or will !equire very high collateral. Another frequently cited reason for a lack of lending to small-and medium-sized firms is the established relationship between banks and large firms and corruption. This is hard to substantiate, but the fact that the quality of loan portfolios of a number of banks in the region has severely deteriorated after they were restructured in the early 1990s means that there has been a problem with the efficiency of the banking sector during the transition.
The allocative role of the stock markets has so far been minimal. Stock markets have been successfully established in most Central European countries, but their trading volumes have been low. Moreover, in some countries, transactions often take place outside the stock markets, thus further reducing their effectiveness.
With external funds being limited, firms have naturally turned to internal financing. Yet, with profits often falling, many enterprises have been unable to raise much investment capital internally in the first few years of the transition. The well-performing ones have increasingly done so, and the imposition of hard budget constraints, price liberalization, and opening up to the world have improved allocation of resources. There are also signs that Western banks have been increasing direct lending to successful businesses in the region.
The second building block for meeting the fundamental challenge of growth is human capital development. One feature that distinguishes the Central European economies from those of many developing countries is the relatively high level of general, as well as specific, education (Boeri and Keese 1992) . Since these countries are also relatively poor in natural resources, investment in human capital is strategically important for their economic progress. Nevertheless, investment in education as well as in research and development (R&D) has been given relatively low priority during the transition. As a result, there has been limited R&D and a significant brain drain in these nations.
The third building block consists of smoothly functioning labor markets and social safety nets. With the notable exception of the Czech Republic, a major challenge for the Central European countries in the 1990s has been unemployment. The problem has been addressed by putting into place adequate social safety nets and by pursuing active labor market policies, such as training of the unemployed. Unfortunately, active micropoliciesalone, are unlikely to dramatically improve labor market efficiency and to substantially reduce unemployment. For example, investing in greater labor mobility across districts would have little effect on unemployment, because the number of jobless within each district greatly exceeds the number of vacancies, both in general and within each educational category (Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell 1995) . Macroeconomic policies and, more generally, those that stimulate economic growth are the more promising solution to the unemployment problem.
The task of reducing unemployment has been complicated by the fact that the provision of social safety nets has been taxing, especially in Hungary and to a lesser extent in Poland, where foreign indebtedness and budget deficits have been major problems. Containing public expenditures will clearly be important but difficult in the face of high unemployment and dissatisfaction with the social cost of transition.
A particularly challenging task in this context is the reduction in the cost of retirement benefits. In this respect, the Central European countries are significantly worse off than either Russia or China, where the burden of retirement benefits is less pronounced. The Central European countries entered the transition period with publicly funded pension systems, almost universal coverage of the population, low retirement ages (on average 60 for men and 55 for women), high and growing dependency ratios, large expenditure and contribution levels, high statutory replacement rates (retirement benefits replace a high proportion of the individual's wages), and a perverse redistribution of benefits. The result of the high dependency ratio is that the system has been very costly and yet offers relatively low benefits (because a large proportion of the population gets retirement benefits, the level of benefits is low). With an aging population and a pay-as-you-go system; the tax burden becomes increasingly heavy. Several countries have already moved to raise the retirement age and to supplement the public retirement system with voluntary private schemes; these are clearly steps in the right direction, but more will need to be done. Raising the retirement age is needed on fiscal as well as on efficiency grounds, although the short-term effect may be an upturn in the already high unemployment rates. Lowering the average wage replacement rate to the level of GECD countries would be desirable, especially if part of the benefits of this restructuring could be channeled into a newly established system of private (supplementary) savings for retirement. Shifting the public system to a broader and less distorting tax base than payroll is also desirable on efficiency and distributional grounds.
A major challenge lies in establishing effective corporate governance, which is a fourth building block for growth. The power of managers and workers (insiders) is often significant, and neither government nor new private owners provide effective control in many firms. The Polish government, for example, yielded significant control rights to workers and managers'already in the 1980s and thus entered the transition with limited powers over enterprises. In contrast, the Czech and Slovak governments kept tight reins during the mass privatization process, but the new dispersed owners or their investment fund representatives have not exercised effective control over management in many privatized firms. The problem is all the more serious because the Central European economies still suffer from a shortage of managerial skills. Managers of (former) state-owned enterprises tend to underestimate the importance of key activities such as quality improvement, marketing, and accounting and audit.
In countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, a conflict of interest has also developed between the banks and the investment privatization funds. With some of the largest funds being owned by the large commercial banks, a bank's desire to initiate bankruptcy of firms may go counter to the interest of the investment fund holding shares of these firms. It is also difficult because the legal system and its enforcement is inadequate. The situation may be serious enough to account in part for the lower volume of bankruptcies in Slovakia and the Czech Republic relative to, for example, Hungary and Poland.
The European Union (EU) is the obvious destination for the Central European countries and thus is an important component of their future growth. Accession negotiations have been under way for several years, and the economic phenomena discussed in this paper are important for the timing of joining. Indeed, much of the economic restructuring observed in these countries is influenced by EU policies, such as the requirement that Central European firms be competitive with their EU counterparts as a precondition to entry into the Union.
A problematic aspect of the relationship between Central and Western Europe is the fact that the "safeguard restrictions" and antidumping procedures used by EU members represent a hindrance to exports from and growth in Central Europe. Studies indicate that the economic impact of exports from Central Europe to the EU is very limited, albeit focused in a few areas. The challenge for the Central Euro-pean economies is to find freer access to ED markets, to use this access to complete restructuring, and eventually to become ED members.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In the early and mid 1990s, the countries of Central Europe carried out the first phase of a historically unprecedented transformation of their centrally planned economies. Despite many remaining imperfections, these countries now have functioning market economies. They have to overcome major structural problems and to meet the lofty expectations of their. peoples. Above all, they face the daunting task of generating the resources and governance structures needed to launch high and sustained rates of economic growth that will improve their efficiency, living standards, and chances of gaining ED membership. In many respects, this challenge, which is more subtle than the earlier elimination of the planning mechanism and the introduction of the· basic building blocks of a market system, is the more difficult part of the transition proc~ss.
NOTES
1. There is no strict definition of "Central Europe." In this article, I will focus on the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia (the so-called Visegrad countries). 2. The numbers reported in Table 1 
